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1. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, international migration is an important and current issue both at a 
European and a global level. According to the UN (2017) there were 258 million 
international migrants worldwide in 2016. However, migration decisions in the 
21st century are characterized by a radically different environment than those in 
previous decades. Thanks to immense technological progress, the costs of mobil-
ity have dropped dramatically (Hoffmann 2010), and this was not accompanied 
by a similar decrease in international development disparities.
This environment influences potential migrants. Although various schools of 
the migration literature explain causes and main driving forces of migration dif-
ferently (see Massey et al. 1993), none of them deny the importance of interna-
tional disparities and the income gap, as well as the influential role of mobility 
costs. However, this implies that circumstances outlined above make migration a 
viable alternative for more and more people living in less developed countries.
The European Union is a spectacular example for this, inasmuch as achieve-
ments of the integration, regulation and other facilitation guarantee the freedom 
of movement for persons, which undoubtedly lessened mobility costs. Besides 
that, possibilities created by technological progress are also available. At the 
same time, development disparities are harshly present among old and new mem-
ber states. As an example, country level data show an up to eight-fold difference 
in annual net earnings1 counted in euros and a two to three times gap can be seen 
even at purchasing power parity (Eurostat 2017). 
Therefore, according to neoclassical economics – which predicts the flow of 
labor until the international equilibration of wages2 – intense waves of migration 
should have been witnessed in this relatively ‘frictionless’ institutional environ-
ment. However, despite any intentions or attempts of the European Commission 
(Andor 2014), intra-EU mobility is low. As an example for the puzzling phenom-
enon of this ‘missing migration’, only 3.0 percentage of European citizens lived in 
a member state other than their country of citizenship in 2016 (Eurostat 2018). 
One cannot rule out the assumption that existing mobility costs are able to 
offset benefits of migration despite their extremely low level, however, anoth-
er important factor remains unexplained. Although people typically move from 
Central East European (CEE) member states to the Western part of the EU, the 
extent of emigration affects CEE countries in a different way. Moreover, migra-
1  Disparities observed in annual net earnings are not exclusive indicators of differences in 
standard of living, but they correlate strongly with other relevant factors.
2  Although assumptions of these neoclassical models are not realistic, the EU can serve as the 
closest real-life example with its relatively ‘frictionless’ institutional framework.
Unauthenticated | Downloaded 05/21/20 09:20 AM UTC
 THE ROLE OF LOYALTY IN MIGRATION INTENTIONS 3
Society and Economy 41 (2019)
tion rates did not correlate with net annual earnings within this group between 
2008 and 2013. 
All the above-mentioned facts strengthen the empirical puzzle that develop-
ment and earning disparities might be offset by other factors in potential mi-
grants’ cognitive framework. This paper hypothesizes that emotional ties, namely 
the presence of loyalty, is an important factor.
Loyalty is represented through psychic costs of migration in this paper. Men-
tioning the role of psychological costs of migration is not a novel idea in migra-
tion literature. Sjaastad (1962), pioneer of the human capital migration theory, 
also discusses the concept, however, he does not treat it as a real resource cost. 
Based on the idea that it is hardly measurable, he does not consider psychologi-
cal costs as analitically usable components among the costs of migration. Other 
prominent scholars (e.g. Bauer – Zimmermann 1995; DaVanzo 1981; Massey 
et al. 1993) simply avoid detailed discussion of this factor, however, they name 
it as an important restraining force. Nonetheless, we argue that consideration of 
psychological costs can help to discover and understand the causes of the above-
mentioned ‘missing migration’ in today’s changed migrational environment. In 
this regard, psychological aspects of migration are not treated as only a type of 
mobility cost. Instead, interdependent preferences and Hirschman’s (1970) loy-
alty concept are used to incorporate these psychological ties into the microeco-
nomic model of migration.
In order to test the role of loyalty empirically, we use individual Eurobarom-
eter data on migration intentions from European Union member states. Loyalty is 
operationalized as a person’s attachment to their city and country. We expect that 
beyond traditional selection factors (e.g. age, gender, family status, labor market 
status, etc.) loyalty ceteris paribus significantly decreases the probability of the 
intention to migrate. Similarly to previous papers (e.g. Fouarge – Ester 2008; 
Sik – Szeitl 2016; Zaiceva – Zimmermann 2008a) logit models are used in the 
estimation.
The paper is structured as follows. After the introductory section, we review 
the basic microeconomic background of migration in order to situate our theory 
in the existing literature (Section 2), then we build our theoretical model of mi-
gration considering loyalty (Section 3). After that, we present the dataset and 
methodology of our empirical test (Section 4). After demonstrating and discuss-
ing our results (Section 5), the paper comes to a conclusion.
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
This paper basically follows the tradition of the neoclassical microeconomic (or 
human capital) approach to migration (for further schools of migration theory see 
Massey et al. 1993). Thus, our unit of analysis is the individual and migration is 
viewed as an individual decision. As Becker (1962) emphasizes, people seek to 
economize rationally with their human capital: one might invest in it to gain max-
imal return. Based on Sjaastad’s (1962) work, also theorized by Hart (1975) and 
Todaro and Maruszko (1987), migration is also a form of human capital invest-
ment. It has costs, but migrants are willing to undertake them in the hope of future 
benefits, which might lead to a better life in a foreign country. This investment 
decision is considered to be self-interested and preceded by rational cost-benefit 
calculation. Thus, potential migrants choose to leave their country of origin if 
benefits overwhelm costs of migration, and therefore it results in a net increase of 
benefits. In this calculation they consider international wage differences, stand-
ard of living disparities and labor market conditions. These market-type factors 
can be supplemented by further aspects that represent the governments’ involve-
ment in real economy (e.g. amount of taxes or public spending on unemployment 
benefits and other welfare expenditures). The net value of the latter is hereinafter 
referred to as net public service level.
The significant impact of the abovementioned factors on migration is verified 
in several empirical studies by using various methods at different levels. As for 
benefits, Ahman et al. (2008) proved the macro-level relevance of real wages and 
unemployment by using time-series from Pakistan. By using panel macro data 
from OECD countries, Mayda (2010) analyzed bilateral flows and found that 
wages and development (proxied by GDP) have a significant effect on migration. 
Sprenger (2013) analyzed intra-EU migration with panel methods and stressed 
the causal relationship between real economy conditions (per capita GDP, unem-
ployment) and migration. Geis et al. (2008) focused on four developed countries 
and used multinomial logistic regression on micro data in order to prove that 
factors defining the net public service level in receiving countries also play an 
important role in migration decisions. Kureková (2013) used quantitative, as well 
as qualitative methods and found that the net public service level and welfare 
systems in countries of origin also affect intra-EU migration.
Benefits of migration may be balanced by its costs. These mobility costs con-
sist of direct costs of travelling, moving and gathering information about job and 
accommodation opportunities as well as indirect costs such as opportunity cost 
of the latter actions or burdens of dealing with regulation (e.g. administrative du-
ties imposed by immigration or visa policy), institutional, cultural and language 
differences.
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The significance of these costs on the migration decision was also tested em-
pirically. Kim and Cohen (2010) proved the relevance of physical and linguistic 
distance by using panel methods in case of Western countries. Mayda (2010) 
and Sprenger (2013) demonstrated the importance of distance, costs of border 
crossing, language similarities and common cultural features while stressing the 
facilitating effect of institutions that guarantee the conditions of free labor flow. 
Palmer and Pytlikova (2015) used panel methods on European data and found a 
causal relationship between labor market regulations of receiving countries and 
the amount of immigration.
All of this can be formalized as follows. Consider the decision of a potential 
migrant who can choose between two alternatives where the above-mentioned 
costs and benefits are illustrated by proxy variables. Assume that their options 
are to stay in the country of origin or to move abroad.3 For the sake of simplicity, 
let us assume only one time period after migration where the related variables 
represent discounted net present values of all future flows of costs and benefits. 
As a result, in line with the aforementioned theoretical considerations and em-
pirical evidences, an agent compares equations (1) and (2) in their cost-benefit 
calculation:
  1  ,o o o o o oNB I G Uα α     (1)
  1 ,r r r r r r mNB I G U Cα α      (2)
where NB is net benefit of related alternatives, I is income obtained from work, 
G is net public service level, U is unemployment benefit and Cm is mobility cost. 
Furthermore, α is the probability of finding a job while o and r indices refer to 
country of origin and receiving country, respectively. It implies that migration is 
a rational choice for the agent if net benefit in the receiving country is higher than 
that in the country of origin. That is:
 .r oNB NB  (3)
For the sake of simplicity, assuming that actors certainly find a job in both 
countries (that is αr = α0 = 1) and defining Δr = Ir – I0, ΔG = Gr – G0 gives the fol-
lowing expression:
 ΔI + ΔG = Cm. (4)
3  Although it may be strange to assume that potential migrants have two alternatives, a rational 
actor faces this kind of situation. Since a potential migrant with perfect information compares 
their situation with the best foreign alternative, therefore it is not necessary to consider more 
options. Nevertheless, it is a harsh constraint that may be loosened in further studies. For 
application of Simon’s (1972) bounded rationality concept in migration theory, see Speare 
(1974).
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This implies that international differences in wages and net public service 
levels may be balanced by mobility costs. Although the operationalization and 
measurement of the latter in monetary terms is not unambiguous, it is undeniable 
that the amount of mobility costs dropped drastically in the last decades, thanks to 
immense technological progress. It follows that nowadays’ extremely low mobil-
ity costs should incentivize rational actors towards migration in the presence of 
huge economic disparities.
In this context, it should be stressed that the economic literature outlined above 
is based on a mostly common idea: voluntary migration is driven by economic 
motives and it can be treated as a migrant’s autonomous or individualistic deci-
sion (Collins 2018). And indeed, this approach undoubtedly explains a significant 
part of international migration. However, new considerations emerged from other 
disciplines of social sciences in order to understand contemporary migration in 
greater depth (Carling – Collins 2018). Besides that, the empirical puzzle out-
lined in Section 1 remains unexplained: why do people stay in their countries of 
origin despite the fact that migration would be beneficial for them in monetary 
terms? We argue that the incorporation of emotional factors would help to explain 
this ‘missing migration’. This is in line with Carling and Collin’s (2018: 913) 
argument which claims that ‘drawing attention to emotions is critical to humanis-
ing migration’. Nevertheless, as opposed to their approach, we do this by extend-
ing the boundaries of the standard human capital model of migration. Existing 
literature also foreshadows this direction. However, while several authors (e.g. 
Bauer – Zimmermann 1995; DaVanzo 1981; De Jong – Fawcett, 1981; Massey et 
al. 1993) acknowledge the importance of psychological costs (due to the separa-
tion from relatives) among non-monetary costs of migration, they do not go into 
details about their ways of functionality. As an example, Sjaastad (1962) does 
not treat them as real resource costs so he does not include them into the cost-
benefit calculation. He argues that psychological costs are hardy measurable and 
are analogous to consumer surplus. Furthermore, it does not affect individual’s 
choice above a certain level. Bodenhöfer (1967) uses the same argument as well. 
However, we disagree with this argument. In Section 3, we build a model that 
incorporates the actor’s psychological ties into the model and thus gives a real 
sense for the psychological cost of migration.
3. THE MODEL
This model focuses on potential migrants’ migration decisions. In the paper, mi-
gration is defined as a voluntary cross-border movement with the aim of long-
term (more than one year) residential settlement. Our special interest concerns 
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labor migration within the institutional framework of the European Union, which 
is still international migration, even though the aim of the European integra-
tion is the creation of a single labor market. Anyway, from a theoretical point 
of view, similar motivations lay behind both internal and international migra-
tion, and the only difference between them lies in their institutional framework 
(Bauer – Zimmermann, 1995). While the EU has major achievements in the field 
of the harmonization of formal institutions, legal differences do exist, and infor-
mal institutions, norms, cultural conventions are still very diverse. The defini-
tion above implies that commuting and other types of short-term movements are 
omitted from this paper. Although these actions may also have similar driving 
forces, psychological costs derived from emotional ties occur mostly in case of 
long term migration.
In this context, our model is directly built on the one described in Section 2. 
We thus follow the Sjaastadian tradition, which is called the neoclassical mi-
croeconomic theory of migration (Massey et al. 1993), standing on the basis of 
methodological individualism. However, as it has been emphasized by other dis-
ciplines of social sciences, desire to migrate and the act of migration cannot be 
understood without its wider social context (Collins 2018). Therefore, we put a 
special emphasis on the social environment of the migration decision. Man is a 
‘social creature’, thus people get in touch with each other, they influence each 
other and they care about others. The circle of care might be narrowed in some 
cases (e.g. restricted to the family), while others might care about their wider 
environment (e.g. neighborhood or the whole society). It often results in people 
not seeking their self-interest but considering the welfare of others, which is the 
case of altruism.
Although altruism contradicts the basic behavioral assumption of economics, 
it has become an ordinary concept – with a huge amount of empirical evidence 
– in mainstream economics as well. It also means that several forms and inter-
pretations of it have been outlined in the economic literature (Golovics 2015). In 
this study, altruism is introduced into the model by using Pollak’s (1976) inter-
dependent preferences concept. This manifestation of altruism was elaborated 
in Becker’s (1974; 1976) work and also applied by Ishikawa (1975), Bolnick 
(1979), Rapoport (1995) and Ottoni-Wilhelm et al. (2017). In these types of mod-
els, other people’s welfare may also be included in the altruist’s utility function, 
which means that considering others’ interest is also part of the agent’s maximiza-
tion problem. However, it should be emphasized that interdependence of utility 
functions is not derived from an externality generated by someone’s action but 
based on interpersonal relations (Choi 1993; Hámori 2003).
Thus, in our model, a potential migrants’ welfare depends not only on their 
own utility but also on changes in others’ utility related to them:
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 ( ; ; ; ; ),i i i x x y y z zU U NB SU SU SUγ γ γ      (5)
where Ui is the agent’s utiliy, NBi is their net benefit level resulting from the mi-
gration decision, ΔSU is the agent’s ‘social utility’ factor that embodies changes 
in others’ utility about whom agent cares. Indices x, y, z refer to these related 
people, while γ measures the strength of their relationship.
These types of altruistic relationships are defined as loyalty in this paper and it 
can be applied towards any person or group. It signifies that we consider a person 
loyal if they have any of this kind of altruistic relationship. Existence and the 
extent of these altruistic relationships may vary among the members of society 
but they are considered to be exogenously given for each individual at the time of 
migration decision making.4
In this context, loyalty is a more complex factor than a simple type of mobility 
cost, labelled as a psychological cost in the previous literature. The latter merely 
refers to welfare loss generated by breaking-up interpersonal ties. However, the 
loyalty concept of this study also takes the fact into account that loyal people 
include each kind of change in related people’s welfare generated by their migra-
tion in their own utility function. The sign of change may also be positive in the 
case when the aim of migration is to find a better job abroad in order to help fam-
ily left behind with remittances – which is also an altruistic and ‘loyal’ motive.
The loyalty concept defined above can be connected to Hirschman’s (1970) 
‘exit-voice-loyalty theory’ as well. According to Hirschman, a person has two 
choices in case of dissatisfaction (e.g. with an organization membership, con-
sumption of a product or living in a country): i) they can choose an exit strategy 
by quitting the situation; or ii) they can give voice to their dissatisfaction while 
staying in the situation. As Mike (2012: 59) stresses, ‘exit and voice may be 
substitutes or complements’, hence dissatisfied individuals’ choice depends not 
just on circumstances and characteristics of the situation but on their loyalty, too. 
Thus, loyalty functions as an equilibrating factor inasmuch as its existence makes 
the choice of exit less likely.
The applicability of Hirschman’s concept in migration theory has already been 
raised in several papers, including Hirschman (1978) himself; however, none of 
them reaches the stage of formal modelling. While Ruget and Usmanalieva (2008) 
discuss the role of loyalty only in general terms, Schewel (2015) and Carling and 
Schewel (2018) mention loyalty as a non-economic retaining factor, Newland 
4  Although this paper treats loyalty as an exogenous factor for reasons of space, the existence 
and the extent of loyalty could be connected to the individual’s previous life. For a detailed 
discussion about the connection between loyalty and previous specific investments, see Mike 
(2012).
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(2010), Johnston (2011) and Burgess (2012) examine the effect of emigrants on 
the politics of their country of origin with qualitative tools, Hoffmann (2010) 
inquires the empirical applicability and a possible extension of Hirschman’s ter-
minology in connection with international migration.
The identity of Hirschman’s loyalty concept with the one defined in this paper 
is manifested in its effect on a migrant’s utility. In Hirschman’s (1970) theory, 
loyal people do not ignore the fate of their former communities. And if they know 
that their exit aggravates the community’s decline, they internalize it as an ‘exit 
tax’.5 Effect of the latter is equivalent to that of loyalty defined in this paper: a 
welfare change in the actor’s utility function. A related person’s psychological 
pain generated by the cessation of daily connections or the negative fiscal ex-
ternality6 born by the society of the home country can be mentioned as types of 
welfare losses, while the assisting force of remittances could be a form of wel-
fare gain in concern. Nonetheless, it should be emphasized that ‘loyalty tax’ in 
our model is only triggered if related people’s welfare changes due to migration. 
Thus, it does not come into effect if family members also migrate with the actor.
All of this can be incorporated into the model outlined above by introducing a 
loyalty factor in a potential migrant’s utility function. Therefore, if the potential 
migrant is loyal (i.e. at least one of γi ≠ 0 (where i = x, y, z, …) in expression (5)), 
then loyalty factor L is added to their net benefits in case of migration which is 
given (6) below.7 This loyalty factor L embodies the net of welfare changes from 
all the altruistic relationships that the actor possesses.8
 (1 )r r r r r r mNB I G U C Lα α       (6)
where i i
i
L SUγ   and (i = x, y, z, …).
5  This concept is similar to Simon’s (1990) idea, who argued that society tends to tax docile 
persons by making them perform altruistic acts.
6  Fiscal externality refers to a situation where local public goods are financed by local taxes. 
In this case, residential decisions (i.e. moving to another municipality) change the tax base 
in cities in concern and, as a result, local governments should change tax rates to maintain 
the former level of public goods or equivalently, adjust the level of public goods provision to 
the new level of tax revenues (Wildasin 1989; Hercowitz – Pines 1991). In case of a person’s 
migration, this effect is marginal. However, in case of mass emigration, negative fiscal exter-
nality effects can be extremely dangerous.
7 It means that in the case of a disloyal person, L = 0.
8  Although, one might argue that the loyalty factor (multiplied either by the same or by another 
parameter) should be included in the potential migrant’s net benefit function in case of staying 
as well, this technique is not applied in this paper. It can be interpreted as follows: migration 
may reduce individual’s welfare through their altruistic relations but staying does not provide 
any welfare surplus.
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In this form, the loyalty factor represents a feedback from related persons’ wel-
fare changes through altruistic bonds. It can be interpreted in a way that a loyal 
individual has such connections with other persons (e.g. friends, family members, 
community, society) that changes in the latter’s welfare (either positive or nega-
tive), have a welfare effect on their own utility with the same sign. And although 
loyalty is hard to operationalize or express in monetary terms, our proposition is 
that loyalty can deter potential migrants from going abroad if:
 0.mI G C L       (7)
This suggests that if the net of wage differences, public service level differenc-
es and mobility costs supplemented by welfare change expressed through loyalty 
factor is negative, then potential migrants choose to stay in the country of origin. 
Thus, loyalty can offset the attractiveness of migration in the presence of huge 
development disparities and low mobility costs. As a result, it may explain the 
“missing migration” puzzle raised in Section 1. Consequently, loyalty towards 
the family, the community or the society of the country of origin may be the rea-
son why masses of EU citizens (mostly from new member states) do not choose 
to live in another member state where the standard of living and labor market 
opportunities are better, despite low mobility costs and institutionally guaranteed 
freedom. 
4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY
In order to empirically test our hypothesis about the role of loyalty in migration 
decisions, we use Eurobarometer survey data and estimate a logistic regression 
model. The main characteristics of the dataset and the exact specification of em-
pirical model are detailed below.
In compliance with our microeconomic theoretic model, micro level data is 
used in empirical tests in order to avoid ecological fallacy. We use individual 
data from Eurobarometer 73.3 (Mar-Apr 2010), which is an EU-wide representa-
tive survey that contains answers from 26,602 respondents (European Commis-
sion 2012). The survey comprises ordinary questions about respondents’ socio-
economic backgrounds, while it contains thematic blocks as well. One of these 
thematic blocks was about the respondent’s mobility history and intentions. This 
wave of Eurobarometer surveys included questions about the respondents’ at-
tachment to different entities as well. This combination of questions makes it 
possible to empirically test our migration model supplemented with loyalty while 
controlling for standard socio-economic variables. 
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Our dependent variable is based on the respondents’ answer about their mi-
gration intention in the next ten years.9 Although statements about future inten-
tions are not equivalent to actual migration, using migration intention data in 
empirical studies is an ordinary practice in migration research (see e.g. Fouarge 
– Ester 2008; Sik – Szeitl 2016) because of the “high correlation between mi-
gration intentions and their realization” (Zaiceva – Zimmermann 2008a: 439). 
Blanchflower et al. (2007) and Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008b) showed that 
characteristics of people who intend to migrate and those of actual migrants are 
quite similar. Sik and Szeitl (2016) confirmed these similarities. Furthermore, 
Böheim and Taylor (2002) found that people with previous preference to move 
are far more likely to go abroad than others. There are practical reasons too for 
using migration intention data. First, researchers face serious difficulties in con-
ceptualization, measurement and registration of migration (for details see Bauer 
– Zimmermann 1995), which results in a lack of cross-country micro data about 
migration, therefore finding a reliable and representative dataset that includes 
personal attributes of migrants and contains these pieces of information about a 
representative reference group, too, (i.e. people who did not emigrate) is hardly 
possible. Secondly, as Bauer and Zimmermann (1995) emphasize, actual migrants 
represent only a very small part of society which may raise problems in estima-
tion, therefore using migration intention data may lighten this inconvenience (i.e. 
people with migration intentions represent a bigger fraction of society). Conse-
quently, although migration intention data overestimates potential migration, it 
can be considered as a sufficient tool to empirically analyze motivations behind 
migration decisions.
In our empirical specification the dependent variable is a dummy, which means 
that we grouped respondents’ answer as follows: 1 if they intend to migrate (very 
likely, fairly likely), 0 if they do not intend to migrate (not very likely, not at 
all likely). If the dependent variable equals 1, then the person is defined to be 
a potential migrant. Figure 1 reports the proportion of potential migrants per 
country.
Our focal independent variables serve as proxies for the different aspects of a 
person’s loyalty. For that, we use answers for survey questions about the respond-
ents’ attachment to their countries (Loyalty/country) and to their cities/towns/
villages (Loyalty/city). Answers are coded as follows: 1: not attached at all; 2: not 
very attached; 3: fairly attached; 4: very attached. We expect that stronger attach-
ment represents stronger altruism towards the community or society of the entity 
in concern, which means that one has less intention to migrate.
9  The exact wording of the question is the following: ‘How likely do you think it is that you will 
move to another country within the next ten years, to live there?’
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Dummies indicating marital status are also used as independent variables (Liv-
ing with partner, Single, Divorced, Widow, where reference group is Married). 
Number of children under 15 (Children) is also an important characteristic. Both 
Becker (1974) and Simon (1993) claim that family is the basis of altruistic rela-
tionships because of sociobiological reasons, so we expect that people with big-
ger and institutionalized families are less likely to migrate.
A respondent’s minority identity in religious, cultural or ethnic dimension 
(Minority ) is another independent dummy variable. Simon (1993) claims that mi-
nority groups tend to teach their docile members to behave altruistically towards 
other group members, thus, the feeling of belonging to a minority group in terms 
of religion, culture or ethnic origin is expected to mitigate migration intentions.
Age is a common control variable in a microeconomic migration model since 
older people have a shorter time horizon on which they can maximize the lifetime 
welfare gain of migration. Besides that, Lowe and Ritchey’s (1973) empirical 
investigation found that older people have more altruistic attitudes than young-
er people, consequently, there may be a correlation between age and altruistic 
Figure 1. Proportion of potential migrants in EU member states (2010)
Source: European Commission (2012).
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loyalty , so it can be assumed that an increase in age decreases the probability of 
migration.
Furthermore, we use further control variables that are common in migration 
literature (see Fouarge – Ester 2008; Sik – Szeitl 2016 and Zaiceva – Zimmer-
mann 2008a). Homeowners and homeowners with mortgage are expected to be 
less likely to migrate since their houses serve as a location specific investment. 
More-educated people (Education) are expected to have higher migration inten-
tions as their human capital is utilized easier in foreign countries too, so they 
have a higher probability of finding a job. The same argument can be applied 
for those people who are fluent in a foreign language (Language). Foreign lan-
guage speakers can also seek information with less transaction costs. Internet 
usage (Internet) also eases information gathering so people who use the internet 
more often are expected to have higher migratory potentials. Since migration 
networks facilitate migration significantly (Massey 1990), it can be expected 
that people with relatives (Network/relatives) or friends (Network/friends) 
abroad are more likely to migrate. The same is expected for those who have 
previous migratory history: i.e. worked abroad (Network/work), studied abroad 
(Network/study), lived abroad (Network/live) or regularly go abroad (Network/
go). To control financial status, a dummy variable (Financial status) is used 
that indicates whether the respondent had difficulties in paying their bills at the 
end of the month in the last twelve months. Because of sociological reasons, we 
also control for respondents’ gender (Male), inhabitancy (Small town and Large 
town) and labor market status (Unemployed, Retired, Student, Self-employed). 
Finally, a dummy (EU15) is used to control for different macroeconomic and 
institutional backgrounds of old and new member states. Descriptive statistics 
for the variables are in Appendix Table A1.
In order to estimate the model, a logistic regression is used. Since our depend-
ent variable is qualitative, simple OLS assumptions do not hold. Because of this, 
the usage of OLS (a so called linear probability model) may predict probabilities 
higher than 1. However, based on its properties, a logit model is an appropri-
ate one for our estimation. Because of the problem of heteroscedasticity, robust 
standard errors are used. Our empirical strategy is to estimate a basic model 
(Specification 1) with ordinary independent variables and another one with sup-
plemented proxies of loyalty (Specification 2). Eventually, we compare them. 
Goodness of fit is measured by the models’ pseudo R-squared and their ability to 
correctly predict values.
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5. RESULTS
Table 1 presents results from estimating Specification 1 and Specification 2. It 
shows marginal effects for the migration intentions related to the intentions to 
stay in the respondents’ home country.
Results show that most of our variables turned to be significant in both speci-
fications and they are in line with general human capital theory of migration. 
Signs and magnitudes of coefficients are similar to those of previous studies (e.g. 
Fouarge – Ester 2008; Sik – Szeitl 2016; Zaiceva – Zimmermann 2008a) as well. 
Older people are less likely to migrate and owning a house (either with mortgage 
or without it) also decreases the willingness to migrate. Potential migrants are 
positively selected with respect to education, language knowledge and internet 
usage. Network effects also matter: having relatives or friends abroad and previ-
ous foreign experiences increase the probability of migration. Those who have 
difficulties with paying the bills are more willing to migrate, which indicates 
that financial reasons may be important driving forces of migration. Willingness 
to migrate is higher among male respondents and people living in towns. Labor 
market status variables are also in line with expectations: unemployed people and 
students are more likely to migrate, while retired respondents have lower migra-
tion intentions. Being employed does not have a significant effect on the willing-
ness to migrate compared to being self-employed in either specification. Citizens 
from old EU member states are less willing to migrate, which can be explained 
by better macroeconomic conditions, standards of living as well as different in-
stitutional backgrounds.
Besides that, loyalty also matters in shaping migration intentions. People who 
are loyal towards their country or city are significantly less willing to migrate. 
In this regard, loyalty towards country has a higher impact. Altruistic considera-
tions towards family members may also matter. People with more children are 
less likely to migrate, while being single or divorced increases the probability 
of migration. Living with a partner or being widowed has a statistically insig-
nificant effect on migration intentions compared to that of married respondents. 
Belonging to a minority group turned out to be significant, however, its impact on 
willingness to migrate contradicts our expectations: members of minority groups 
have larger intentions to migrate. The reason behind it may be complex. On the 
one hand, as DaVanzo (1981) emphasizes, former migration experiences foster 
repeated migration. Thus, the supposition that members of minority groups may 
be immigrants can be an explanation for their higher willingness to migrate. The 
fact that minorities tend to be displaced to the periphery of society may also 
enhance migration intentions. In this respect, note that altruism may foster emi-
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Table 1. Determinants of migration intentions in the EU. Marginal effects from Logit model
 Specification 1 Specification 2
 Migration intention
Loyalty/country –0.0252*** (0.00238)
Loyalty/city –0.0118*** (0.00206)
Living with partner 0.00850 (0.00518)
Single 0.0222*** (0.00500)
Divorced 0.0168** (0.00735)
Widow 0.00367 (0.0107)
Children –0.00959*** (0.00179)
Minority 0.0278*** (0.00566)
Age –0.00298*** (0.000145) –0.00260*** (0.000165)
Homeowner –0.0234*** (0.00366) –0.0134*** (0.00384)
Homeowner with 
mortgage –0.0253*** (0.00313) –0.0166*** (0.00349)
Education 0.000826** (0.000321) 0.000709** (0.000327)
Language 0.0180*** (0.00319) 0.0121*** (0.00332)
Internet 0.00309*** (0.000736) 0.00365*** (0.000809)
Network/relatives 0.0239*** (0.00341) 0.0235*** (0.00363)
Network/friends 0.0524*** (0.00349) 0.0499*** (0.00371)
Network/work 0.0434*** (0.00555) 0.0421*** (0.00584)
Network/study 0.0187*** (0.00580) 0.0120** (0.00579)
Network/live 0.0408*** (0.00648) 0.0338*** (0.00661)
Network/go 0.0180*** (0.00383) 0.0119*** (0.00384)
Financial status 0.0271*** (0.00326) 0.0255*** (0.00353)
Male 0.0184*** (0.00290) 0.0125*** (0.00306)
Small town 0.0120*** (0.00358) 0.00856** (0.00374)
Large town 0.0171*** (0.00387) 0.0118*** (0.00403)
Unemployed 0.0201*** (0.00701) 0.0164** (0.00734)
Retired –0.0171** (0.00688) –0.0210*** (0.00702)
Student 0.0745*** (0.0117) 0.0483*** (0.0109)
Employed 0.00164 (0.00536) –0.00226 (0.00554)
EU15 –0.00958*** (0.00322) –0.0114*** (0.00350)
Pseudo R2 0.2385 0.2649
Observations 25,230  20,139  
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Significances: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Reference groups 
are married, not owning a house, not feeling belonging to a minority group, not speaking any language flu-
ently, not having any network abroad, not having financial difficulties at paying the bills, female, rural area, 
self-employed.
Source: author’s calculations based on European Commission (2012).
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gration if the individual would be able to help the family by moving to another 
country which is in line with our theoretical model.
As a result, loyalty contributes to increasing the explanatory power of the 
standard microeconomic model of migration. By adding proxies of loyalty, no 
standard variable changes its sign or loses its significance. Pseudo R-squared of 
Specification 2 is 2.64 percentage points higher than that of Specification 1, which 
is a moderate difference, however, note that Logit models do not tend to have 
high Pseudo R-squared values in empirical studies.10 Concerning the predictive 
power of the model, Specification 2 is able to correctly classify 88.27 percentage 
of observations by using a cutoff point at 0.5 (which is also a moderate increase 
if we consider that Specification 1 is able to correctly classify 87.44 percentage 
of observations). Nevertheless, incorporating loyalty into the model enhances its 
explanatory power even if it is a slight increase.
Although these results support the argument that loyalty matters in shaping 
migration intentions, our empirical investigation has limitations. Survey data has 
been taken in 2010, after the financial crisis, so special distortion may be present 
in the data set. Besides that, although using migration intention data is an ordi-
nary practice in migration literature, it has to be emphasized that articulation 
of intention to migrate is only a necessary but not sufficient condition to actual 
migration. As Carling and Schewel (2018) and Gödri and Feleky (2017) argue, 
certain barriers may prevent actual migration even if one aspires to move. Conse-
quently, further research – if it is possible – is needed on actual migration data in 
order to test the robustness of our results.
6. CONCLUSIONS
This paper focused on the determinants of individual migration decisions. Al-
though neoclassical human capital theory of migration has major achievements 
in this field, its explanatory power is unsatisfactory since it ignores many psycho-
logical aspects of the decision as well as the well-known fact that people feel like 
belonging to a certain community. Thus, this paper aimed at building a theoretical 
framework that incorporated loyalty into the microeconomic theory of migration. 
In this regard, a plausible and well-grounded theoretical model was built that was 
able to provide a reason for the unexplained ‘missing’ migration in the European 
Union.
10  See Sik and Szeitl (2016) or Zaiceva and Zimmermann (2008a), where pseudo R-squared 
values tend to move between 0.10 and 0.21.
Unauthenticated | Downloaded 05/21/20 09:20 AM UTC
 THE ROLE OF LOYALTY IN MIGRATION INTENTIONS 17
Society and Economy 41 (2019)
Our model was tested empirically on migration intentions data. Although vari-
ables used in the empirical model are not entirely novel in migration studies, this 
time they were supported by a solid economic model that is perfectly compat-
ible with neoclassical human capital theory. Estimations show that loyalty indeed 
matters in shaping people’s willingness to migrate, however, robustness of results 
could be enhanced if better data were available. Nonetheless, the analysis in this 
paper showed that the presence of altruistic ties and loyalty towards individuals’ 
community may make them to stay in their country of origin even though migra-
tion would be a rational alternative from a financial point of view.
Results of this paper open new perspectives in migration studies. On the one 
hand, our hypothesis could be tested on other types of datasets (e.g. about actual 
migration or with higher variance in the dependent variable). On the other hand, 
it sheds another light on existing literature. In line with migration network theory 
(Massey 1990), altruistic relationships defined in this paper may also strengthen 
one’s willingness to migrate if one’s loved ones have already migrated. However, 
it seems to contradict the theory outlined above, and the truth is that ‘net util-
ity’ from emotional bonds play an important role in migration choices. Finally, 
this paper re-opens the question about self-interest and raises questions about 
the origins of altruism in order to understand the very nature of human decision-
making.
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APPENDIX
Table A1. Descriptive statistics
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Dependent variable
Migration intention 26602 .1363807 .3431988 0 1
Independent variables
Loyalty\country 26520 3.54868 .630651 1 4
Loyalty\city 26527 3.376371 .7580354 1 4
Living with partner 26571 .0925069 .2897456 0 1
Single 26571 .1943096 .3956757 0 1
Divorced 26571 .0745173 .2626159 0 1
Widow 26571 .0905498 .2869733 0 1
Children 26602 .4465078 .8812927 0 14
Minority 21132 .0998012 .2997419 0 1
Age 26602 47.97042 18.20096 15 97
Homeowner 26602 .5281182 .4992181 0 1
Homeowner with mortgage 26602 .231975 .4221011 0 1
Education 26088 18.81923 5.087374 0 90
Language 26518 .4530508 .4978003 0 1
Internet 26602 3.523682 2.530618 0 6
Network\relatives 26525 .3295005 .4700407 0 1
Network\friends 26522 .4529824 .4977938 0 1
Network\work 26552 .1402531 .347256 0 1
Network\study 26557 .0809203 .2727178 0 1
Network\live 26556 .1056258 .3073639 0 1
Network\go 26523 .2126456 .4091867 0 1
Financial status 25974 .3975129 .4893931 0 1
Male 26602 .4608676 .4984757 0 1
Small town 26582 .3544128 .478344 0 1
Large town 26582 .2818449 .4499066 0 1
Unemployed 26602 .1641982 .3704623 0 1
Retired 26602 .2877227 .4527097 0 1
Student 26602 .082287 .2748067 0 1
Employed 26602 .3943313 .4887158 0 1
Source: author’s calculations based on European Commission (2012).
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